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SWIDLER & BERLIN v. UNITED STATES: YE SHALL
KNOW THE TRUTH IF THE TRUTH SHALL
SET YE FREE

TiHE CuENT
Vincent F. Foster, Jr. was a sheltered man. Each day, he
carpooled to his office at Little Rock's Rose law firm, often remaining
silent during the fifteen-minute drive.' But suddenly, Foster found
himself far from his native Arkansas-the new deputy White House
Counsel to a young, scandal-plagued Clinton administration.
Soon, Foster verged on emotional collapse. Haunted by "immense" time pressures and by culture inside the Beltway, where "ruining people [was] considered sport,"2 Foster increasingly worried that
the White House might have acted unlawfully when it dismissed its
3
Travel Office staff; perhaps, he thought, even he had violated the law.
"Travelgate," as the controversy came to be called, received a lot
of media attention, and in its midst, the President invited Foster to
join him at a screening of In the Line of Fire.4 The film
starr[ed] Clint Eastwood as a Secret Service agent who fails to protect the president .....
[H]e'd seen enough stressful movies, having recently watched
A Few Good Men, starring Tom Cruise and Jack Nicholson. In the

movie, lieutenant colonel Matthew Markinson conspires to cover up
the circumstances of the death of a young soldier. As an investigation progresses, the colonel is called to testify at upcoming hearings
against his commander, an old friend. Torn by guilt over his role in
the soldier's death and over the prospect of incriminating his comI

SeeJAmES STE-WART, BLOOD SPORT 34 (1996).
2 Excerpt from Independent Counsel's Report on Foster's Death, N.Y. TiMEis, Oct. 11,
1997, at A8. Foster complained of the time pressures and the White House's "mind-

boggling" legal problems in a letter to a friend. Contents of the letter were included
in a report by Whitewater Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr. See Stephen Labaton,
A Report on His Suicide Portraysa Deeply Troubled Vince Foster,N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 11, 1997,
at Al.
3

See STEWART, supra note 1, at 287.

4
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manding officer, Markinson puts a revolver into his mouth and
5
pulls the trigger.
Foster did not attend the screening. The next day, he was found dead
6
in Fort Marcy Park, Virginia, the victim of an apparent suicide.
Just days before, Vince Foster had sought legal representation
from James Hamilton, a lawyer at the Washington, D.C., firm of Swidler & Berlin, apparently in relation to the Travel Office controversy.
During the meeting, Foster sought and received Hamilton's assurances that the secrecy of their conversation would be protected by the
7
attorney-client privilege.
Foster's death did nothing to quell the Travel Office scandal;8
more than two years later, Hamilton's notes of the meeting were subpoenaed by the Office of the Independent Counsel (OIC) investigating the matter. Seeking to protect Foster's secrets under the attorneyclient privilege, Hamilton eventually argued his own case before the
Supreme Court.9 In Swidler & Berlin v. United States,10 the Court held
5 Id. at 287-88.
6 See Gwen Ifill, White House Aide Found Dead; Close Associate of the Clintons, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 1993, at Al.
7 See Petitioners' Brief at 2, Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081
(1998) (No. 97-1192). The nature of the conversation was reflected by an entry near
the top of Hamilton's notes. They were labeled "Privileged." See Swidler & Berlin, 118
S. Ct. at 2083.
8 Following Foster's death, various conspiracy theories emerged in certain circles. Apparently, some theories were more incredible than others; consider the
following:
Researcher Sherman Skolnick, who has been prominent in conspiratorial circles since Watergate, insists Foster died trying to prevent a CIA-aided
assassination of Saddam Hussein in July. Such a plot, but not a supposed
Foster connection, was later reported upon in the London Sunday Times.
Foster did not attempt to do this out of love for Saddam or even to make
tomorrow better than today, according to Skolnick's scenario. He did it to
prevent Saddam's half-brother from releasing bank records revealing Clinton and Bush involvement with BNL.
Kenn Thomas, Clinton Era Conspiracies! Was Gennifer Flowers on the Grassy Knoll?, WAsH.
PosT, Jan. 16, 1994, at C3. In October 1997, a government report confirmed that
Foster's death had been a suicide. See Labaton, supra note 2.
9 See Marcia Coyle, Two Stars Make PrivilegeArguments, NAT'L L.J., June 22, 1998,
at A10:
Although not unprecedented, it is unusual to see a lawyer representing himself in arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court. But while the old adage
often may be true-that the lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a
client-it couldn't have been more misplaced than on June 8 in the arguments over attorney-client privilege.... Mr. Hamilton has written a book on
congressional investigations and a score of articles on, among other things,
attorney-client privilege issues.
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that the notes were privileged despite Foster's death, assuring that the
client and his secrets would rest in peace.
I.

PROBLEM: THE PRIVILEGED AND THE DAMNED

Your client is on trialfor double-homicide. Two lauyers,following an informal opinion by the State Ethics Committee, have stated their willingness to
testifj before the court that their client, now deceased, had confessed to the
killings when they had represented the thirdparty for an unrelated murder
committed in the same vicinity as the murdersfor which your client is prosecuted. The trial court rules, on its own motion, that the lawyers' testimony,
which would likely exculpate your client, is shielded by the attorney-client
privilege. Your client is convicted and sentenced to two life sentences. On
appeal, what ruling and why? 1l
A.

Privilege at a Price

That the laws of evidence seek to realize conflicting objectivestruth, justice, and efficiency, for instance-is at once their bane and
glory.' 2 Reconciling different doctrines is an exercise in compromise,

albeit a purely academic exercise, at least when undertaken by students. In the hands of a judge, however, the effects of such exercises
are real. The guilty may escape unpunished, or the innocent may

wind up in jail-or worse.
Testimonial privileges are especially intriguing because they so
clearly stifle courts' truth-seeking mission.' 3 The attorney-client privilege, which protects confidential communications between lawyers
Id.
10 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998). Swidler & Berlin, along with its effect on future qualification of the attorney-client privilege, is the focus of this Note.
11 Based on Arizona v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976).
12 See FED. R. EvrD. 102 ("Purpose and Construction. These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and
delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end
that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."); CHRISTOPHER
B. MUrLL R & LAiRD C. KuRKPATRica, EVIDENCE § 1.1, at 1-3 (1995) (law of evidence

motivated by mistrust ofjuries, substantive policies, desire for accuracy, and judicial
efficiency); Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? OnJudicialProofand the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1357, 1378 (1985) (law of evidence "serve [s] to enhance the acceptability of judicial verdicts").
13 See, e.g., MUELLER & KIRKPATMRCK, supra note 12, § 5.1, at 329:
Privileges are a unique aspect of evidence law because they rest upon a
different rationale than most other rules of evidence and sweep more
broadly. They are not designed to enhance the reliability of the fact-finding
process. On the contrary, they impede the search for truth by excluding
evidence that may be highly probative.
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and their clients, is the oldest of these privileges. 14 The doctrine originally recognized the importance of a lawyer's oath and honor, but the
15
device survives under the rhetoric of protecting the needs of clients.
The classic definition of the attorney-client privilege is credited to
Professor Wigmore. As restated by Judge Wyzanski in United States v.
16
United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege
is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his
subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the
attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of
strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an
opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal
proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or
tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived
17
by the client.
B.

Strict Construction

Also credited to Wigmore is the view that the privilege should be
strictly construed. He wrote:
Its benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain
and concrete ....
It is worth preserving for the sake of a general
policy, but it is nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation of the
truth. It ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible
18
limits consistent with the logic of its principle.
Id.; PAUL R. RiCE, A TRNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 2:2, at 51-52
(1993) ("While it is an established principle that the public has a right 'to every man's
evidence,' the attorney-client privilege is an exception to that rule.") (footnote
omitted).
14 See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989) ("We have recognized the
attorney-client privilege under federal law, as 'the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law.'"); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290,
at 542 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
15 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2290, at 543 ("That new theory looked to the
necessity of providing subjectively for the client'sfreedom of apprehension in consulting [a]
legal adviser. . . ."). For a discussion of modern rationales for the attorney-client

privilege see infra Part IL
16 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
17 Id. at 358-59. More than 300 cases have cited Wyzanski's definition. See RICE,
supra note 13, § 2:1, at 48 n.7 (1993 & Supp. 1998) (including sample of cases).
18 8 WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2291, at 554; see also 1 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 503.1, at 527 n.3 (4th ed. 1996) ("Like all privileges the
lawyer-client privilege is to be strictly construed.").
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Courts have generally agreed. 19
How has the principle that the attorney-client privilege should be
strictly confined within narrow limits affected its development? For
example, what should a lawyer do in the case of a client who seeks the
lawyer's services in furtherance of a crime? Or when a client sues the
lawyer for malpractice? Or when the lawyer's disclosure of a conversation could resolve a controversy involving a will prepared for a nowdeceased client? For each of these scenarios, the law has created an
exception. 20 But what about the lawyer, as in the problem, with information shared by a now-deceased client that is important to a criminal
19 See RIcE, supra note 13, § 2:3, at 55. Consult the following two examples:
United States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437, 1441 (4th Cir. 1986) ("We have stated repeatedly that the attorney-client privilege is to be strictly construed, in order to harmonize
it, to the extent possible, with the truth-seeking mission of the legal process.") (citations omitted); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977)
(privilege is strictly construed because of its "adverse effect" on disclosure of truth).
20 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, §§ 5.22-.24, at 419-29. The Revised Uniform Evidence Rules contained a "clear statement of the scope of the privilege as now generally accepted." McComeIca, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 206
(3d ed. 1986); see also RvXsED UNrome RULE OF EVIDENCE 502 (1974), quoted in McCoPmiciC, supra, § 87, at 206-07 n.10:
(d) ExCEPI'ONS. There is no privilege under this rule:
(1) Furtherance of Crime or Fraud. If the services of the lawyer were
sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit
what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or
fraud;
(2) Claimants Through Same Deceased Client. As to a communication relevant to an issue between parties who claim through the same deceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intestate succession or
by inter vivos transaction;
(3) Breach ofDuty by a Lauyer or Client. As to a communication relevant
to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to his client or by the client to his
lawyer;
(4) DocumentAttested by a Layer. As to a communication relevant to an
issue concerning an attested document to which the lawyer is an attesting
witness;
(5) Joint Clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of common interest between or among two or more clients if the communication
was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common,
when offered in an action between or among any of the clients; or
(6) Public Officer or Agency. As to a communication between a public
officer or agency and its lawyers unless the communication concerns a pending investigation, claim, or action and the court determines that disclosure
will seriously impair the ability of the public officer or agency to process the
claim or conduct a pending investigation, litigation, or proceeding in the
public interest.
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proceeding? After all, subject to the limits of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, the client, if alive, could be compelled to testify before a grand jury or a court. That conversations
between clients and lawyers are not absolutely shielded from compelled disclosure merely illustrates what is obvious. At some point, the
policy of fostering lawyer-client relationships must give way to other
values. When this should occur is not so obvious.
C. Defendant's ConstitutionalRights
The problem, The Privileged and the Damned, raises several constitutional concerns. In the problem, evidence that could exculpate the
defendant has been ruled inadmissible. In United States v. Nixon,21 the
Supreme Court acknowledged: "The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon every defendant in a criminal trial the right 'to be confronted with the witnesses against him' and 'to have compulsory
21 418 U.S. 683 (1974). United States v. Nixon was not an attorney-client privilege
case. President Richard Nixon had moved to quash a subpoena that required production of certain tapes and writings "relating to certain precisely identified meetings
between the President and others." Id. at 688. The President argued, in part, that the
communications were shielded from disclosure by an "executive privilege." The
Court rejected this argument.
The Court acknowledged the existence of important policies that are furthered
by recognition of an executive privilege, see id. at 706 ("The President's need for complete candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the courts."),
but given the existence of other important values, the privilege was not absolute, see
id. Furthermore, qualification would not render the privilege ineffective. The Court
said:
Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even
the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications
is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all of the protection that a district court will be obliged to
provide.
Id.
Although the confidentiality of Presidential communications historically had
been given judicial protection when the communications involved diplomatic and
military secrets, "[n]o case of the Court, ha[d] extended this high degree of deference to a President's generalized interest in confidentiality." Id. at 711. Still, the
Court was moved by the privilege's constitutional underpinnings. See id. ("[T]o the
extent this interest related to the effective discharge of a President's powers, it is constitutionally based.").
But despite the privilege's constitutional character, the court found it proper to
"weigh the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of presidential communications in performance of his responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of criminal justice." Id.
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process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."' 22 In order to guarantee
these rights, the Court continued, "it is essential that all relevant and
admissible evidence be produced." 23 Unfortunately for the criminal
defendant in the problem, Sixth Amendment rights and the right to
due process of law are not absolute. The rules of evidence are
trumped only if policies embodied in the rules of evidence are outweighed by the limitation of the defendant's rights, 24 whatever that

means.
D.

Thesis and Roadmap

This Note is an exercise to analyze posthumous application of the
attorney-client privilege and to isolate the point at which the privilege's justifications no longer support shielding conversations from
disclosure. There are two prevailing (and polar) views. At one pole
are those (arguably, Professor Wigmore is among them) who believe
that the privilege should protect absolutely lawyer-client conversations
after the death of the client. At the opposite pole are those (Judge
Learned Hand is one) who believe that the privilege should automatically terminate at death. In Swidler & Berlin,25 the Supreme Court
held that the venerable privilege prevented disclosure to a criminal
grand jury of notes taken by a lawyer during a conversation with a
now-deceased client. 26 The decision was immediately hailed as a tri22

Id. (emphasis added).

23 Id.
24 See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1987). Unlike privilege cases, this
case involved a rule that did not allow a defendant to testify, even if she wanted to.
Vickie Lorene Rock was convicted of manslaughter for shooting her husband Frank
after he had refused to let her eat some pizza. "A dispute had been simmering about
Frank's wish to move from the couple's small apartment adjacent to Vickie's beauty
parlor to a trailer she owned outside town." Id. at 45. In preparation for trial,
Vickie's lawyer suggested hypnosis, since she could not remember the details of the
shooting, and when the prosecutor learned of the sessions, he moved to exclude her
posthypnotic testimony. See id. at 46-47.
The United States Supreme Court rejected Arkansas' per se rule excluding posthypnotic testimony. It said:
Of course, the right to present relevant testimony is not without limitation. The right "may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process." But restrictions of a
defendant's right to testify may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the

purposes they are designed to serve. In applying its evidentiary rules a State
must evaluate whether the interests served by a rule justify the limitation
imposed on the defendant's constitutional right to testify.
Id. (citations omitted).

25 118 S. CL 2081 (1998), rev'gln reSealed Case, 124 F.Sd 230 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
26 See id. at 2088.
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umph for the legal profession 2 7 and is now the subject of this Case
Comment. My thesis is that, in light of Swidler & Berlin, neither of the
polar positions is tenable. Specifically, footnote 3 in Swidler & Berlin
indicates that there could be constitutional limits to the attorney-cli28
ent privilege.
Swidler & Berlin reversed a court of appeals decision, In re Sealed
Case,29 which held that in criminal proceedings, the attorney-client
privilege should cease to operate posthumously if the relative importance of the communications is substantial.3 0 The majority's test,
which was assailed as vague, was supported by a convoluted opinion.
Nevertheless, Sealed Case has been revived for this Comment. Using it
as a foundation, I argue for posthumous qualification of the attorneyclient privilege (Part III-A). Once I've made these arguments, I review
their rejection by the Supreme Court (Part III-B). Despite the Court's
opinion in Swidler & Berlin, however, I conclude that the door is open
for posthumous limits to the attorney-client privilege when a defendant's constitutional rights are at stake; such an "exception" would be
consistent with the policies furthered by the privilege and could set
free the criminal defendant in The Privileged and the Damned (Part IV).
First, however, the Case Comment outlines the history and theory of
the. attorney-client privilege (Part II).
II. ArORNEY-CLiENT PRIVILEGE FOR UTiLITARSANS, DEONTOLOGISTS,
AND LAwYERS

The attorney-client privilege shields from disclosure communications between lawyers and clients.31 Along with a lawyer's duty of confidentiality, 3 2 the privilege is a defining characteristic of the client27 See Marcia Coyle, Your Answer, Mr. Rehnquist, NAT'L L.J., June 29, 1998, at A17
(reporting that 65% of lawyers polled believed the privilege should protect communications after a client's death); Editorial, USA TODAY (visited June 25, 1998) <http://
ww.usatoday.com/news/comment/edtwof.htm> ("Sorry, the court said, lawyer-client
privilege, upon which anyone could one day depend, can't be weakened for [Independent Counsel Kenneth] Starr's convenience. Innocent others would pay the
price.") (copy on file with the Notre Dame Law Review).
28 See 118 S. Ct. at 2087 n.3.
29 124 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
30 See id. at 235.
31 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supranote 12, §§ 5.8-.30, at 357-459; RiCE, supra
note 13; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 14, §§ 2292-329, at 554-641.
32 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983):

(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that
are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and ex-

cept as stated in paragraph (b).
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lawyer relationship.3 3 Although the rule reflects ancient ideals-with
roots in Roman law3 4 and in Elizabethan England 3 5 -its development
was retarded until the last two centuries.3 6 At Roman law, the privilege manifested a general moral duty, but it was rationalized as facili37
tating the determination of truth.
The theory seems to have been that if a member of a family testified
in behalf of another-or an advocate on behalf of his client-he
could not be believed because he had a strong motive for misstate(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) To prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm;

or
(2) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal
charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the
client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
Id.
33 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An HistoricalPerspectiveon the Attorney-Client Privilege,
66 CAL. L. Rv. 1061, 1061 (1978) ("The attorney-client privilege may well be the
pivotal element of the modern American lawyer's professional functions."); see also
CHLxA.s W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics § 6.1.1, at 242 (1986) ("By turns both
sacred and controversial, the principle of confidentiality of client information is wellembedded in the traditional notion of the Anglo-American client-lawyer relationship."); James A. Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of the Attorne-ClientPrivilege,8 ViLL. L. REV.
279, 284 (1963) ("In our adversary system of administering justice, the lawyer occupies a central position as investigator, adviser, manager, and repository of facts and
law. This makes the attorney-client privilege the most important of the personal
privileges.... .").
34 See Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Langer and
Client, 16 CAL. L. Rxv. 487, 488 (1928) ("Cicero in prosecuting the Roman governor
of Sicily regrets that he cannot summon the latter's patronus,Hortensius ... and the
matter had received statutory regulation in the Acilian law on bribery of 123 B.C....
By later imperial mandate, advocates and attorneys.., were made completely incompetent as witnesses in the case in which they acted.").
35 See 8 WIGMoRE, supranote 14, § 2290, at 542 ("The history of this privilege goes
back to the reign of Elizabeth I, where the privilege already appears as unquestioned."). Whether the emergence of the attomey-client privilege in England was
owed to the Roman law is a matter that has not been proven. See Radin, supra note
34, at 489.
36 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2290, at 543 ("[D]etailed rules of this privilege... were still in the formative stage in the first half of the 1800s."); Hazard, supra
note 33, at 1070 ("[Rlecognition of the privilege was slow and halting until after
1800.").
37 See Radin, supra note 34, at 488.
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ment. If he violated group solidarity by testifying 38against him, he
was a disreputable person and unworthy of belief.

Like the Roman rule, the English "point of honor" realized a
moral obligation-the lawyer's "solemn pledge of secrecy. '39 And like
its Roman counterpart, this rhetoric eventually gave way to instrumental concerns-"providing subjectively for the client's freedom of ap'40
prehension in consulting his legal advisor.
Universally recognized in American courts, the privilege furthers
policies at the expense of the paramount value of truth. 4 ' In theory,
the privilege results in a net societal gain. It encourages disclosure,
and thus lawyers are able to offer effective representation, furthering
observance of the law and the administration ofjustice-or so the utilitarian theory goes. Still another popular justification focuses on the
client's rights. Under the rights-based (or deontological) rationale,
confidentiality rules exist to promote the individual's autonomy and
private character.
A.

The Utilitarian

Utilitarianismis a theory about rightness, according to which the only good
thing is welfare (wellbeing or 'utility'). Welfare should, in some way, be
maximized, and agents are to be neutral between their own welfare, and that
of other people and other sentient beings.
Utilitarianismhas usually focused on actions. The most commonform
is act-utilitarianism,accordingto which what makes an action right is its
42

maximizing total or average utility.

The utilitarian justification for the attorney-client privilege begins
by recognizing "that society has an interest in the fair administration
of justice and that the fact-finding process in adversary litigation can
be accurately administered only when the lawyer involved is entirely
familiar with the client's cause."'43 Wigmore concludes: "In order to
promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal advisers must be removed; hence the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the
44
client's consent."
38 Id. at 488-89.
39 8 WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2290, at 543.
40 Id.
41 See supra notes 13-15, 18-19 and accompanying text.
42 9 RoUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHrLosoPHy 551 (Edward Craig ed., 1998).
43 Gardner, supra note 33, at 292.
44 8 WIGMoRE, supranote 14, § 2291 at 545. Utilitarianism's heyday occurred during the nineteenth century, and it is not surprising that the first modem examination
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The utilitarian justification has been the dominant defense of the
privilege, 45 but the theory is by no means unsinkable. 46 The first attack is predictable-that the privilege makes courts' mission to ascertain truth more difficult.4 7 A second attack questions the accuracy of

the premise that clients will not engage in "full and frank" communication with their lawyers unless secrecy is guaranteed. 48 The most faof the attorney-client privilege rested on such analysis. See Gardner, supranote 33, at
285.
45 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348
(1985) ("[The attorney-client privilege] encourages observance of the law and aids in
the administration of justice."); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389
(1981): The Upjohn Court noted:
[The purpose of the attorney-client privilege] is to encourage full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's
being fully informed by the clients.
Id.; see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 5.8, at 359 n.14 (quoting ALI
MODEL CODE OF EvIDENCE Rule 210 cmt. a, at 147 (1942)). Mueller & Kirkpatrick
observed:
To induce clients to make ... communications, the privilege to prevent
their later disclosure is said by courts and commentators to be a necessity.
The social good derived from the proper performance of the functions of
lawyers acting for their clients is believed to outweigh the harm that may
come from the suppression of the evidence in specific cases.
Id.
46 For a summary of the utilitarian justification for the attorney-client privilege
(and attacks on this justification) see Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty to Warn
Clients About the Limits on Confidentiality,39 CATH. U. L. REV. 441, 443-51 (1990).
47 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 5.8, at 360; 8 WIGMORE, supra
note 14, § 2291, at 554 ("IT] he privilege remains an exception to the general duty to
disclose. Its benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete.... It is worth preserving for the sake of general policy, but it is nonetheless an
obstacle to the investigation of the truth."); see also McCoRmici, supranote 20, § 87, at
205 ("If one were legislating for a new commonwealth, without history or customs, it
might be hard to maintain that a privilege for lawyer-client communications would
facilitate more than it would obstruct the administration ofjustice.").
48 See Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IowA L. REv. 351, 386-87
(1989) (figures from a Yale LawJournalstudy "support the notion that confidentiality
rules have some impact on the way clients use attorneys. But they also cast doubt on
whether the effect is as substantial as proponents of confidentiality presume.").
Zacharias presented the results of his more recent survey: "Most lawyers surveyed believed that they would get the same information from clients even if they never informed the clients about confidentiality. A higher percentage, 85.9%, believed they
would get enough information to represent clients competently." Id.; see also WOLFRM, supra note 33, § 6.1.3, at 243.
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rebuke was issued by Jeremy Bentham, who in 1827 argued
that the attorney-client privilege produced a net societal loss;, he argued that the rule protected only the guilty, since the innocent would
have nothing to hide.50 For the most part, however, the attorney-client privilege has not been overwhelmed, 5 1 and Bentham's argument,
52
in particular, has been dismissed as overly simplistic.
B.

The Deontologist

Deontology asserts that there are several distinct duties. Certainkinds of act
are instrinsicallyright and other kinds instrinsicallywrong. The rightness
or wrongness of any particularact is thus not (or not wholly) determined by
53
the goodness or badness or its consequences.
49

Bentham's argument has been called "slashing," McCoRmicK, supra note 20,

§ 87, at 205, and "acidly worded," WOLFRAM, supra note 33, § 6.1.4, at 246.
50 SeeJEREMY BENTHAM,RATIONALE OFJUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827), 7 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 474, in 8 WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2291, at 549:
The man by the supposition is guilty; if not, by the supposition there is
nothing to betray: let the law adviser say every thing he has heard, every
thing he can have heard from his client, the client cannot have any thing to
fear from it.... [t]
he first thing the advocate or attorney will say to his client
will be,-Remember that, whatever you say to me, I shall be obliged to tell, if
asked about it. What, then, will be the consequence? That a guilty person
will not in general be able to derive quite so much assistance form his law
adviser, in the way of concerting a false defence, as he may do at present.
Id.
51 See WOLFRAM, supra note 33, § 6.1.4, at 247:
[Defenders of the privilege) respond in kind that the harm from the
concealment of truth caused by the privilege is more than offset by the good
of assisting the innocent victim of suspicious circumstances. On those terms,
it is by no means clear whether Bentham or his utilitarian critics have the
better of the empirical argument."
Id. Most recently, the Supreme Court in Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct.
2081 (1998), repeated that "[t] he privilege is intended to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader
public interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice." Id. at
2084. See generally Part III-B of this Note.
52 See 8 WIGMORE, supranote 14, § 2291, at 552-53 (suggesting that argument was
overly simplistic since (1) in many civil cases, it is impossible to distinguish between
the truly innocent and the truly guilty; (2) even the innocent, if victim of suspicious
circumstances, may fear disclosure of client-lawyer communications; (3) the argument
that the privilege encourages concerting a "false defence" suggests that the bar is
unprincipled, in which case denial of the privilege would have little effect; and (4) if
lawyers were compelled to disclose, talented individuals would refrain from practicing
law, "for it must be repugnant to any honorable man to feel that the confidences
which his relation naturally invites are liable at the opponent's behest").
53 2 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 42, at 551.
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Immanuel Kant framed the categorical imperative: "Act as if the
maxim of your action were to become through your will a UNIVERSAL LAW OF NATURE. '54 It followed that "persons must always be
treated as ends in themselves and not as means to ends,"55 and that
"conduct is to be judged moral only if it protects the autonomy of
5' 6
individuals.
According to the rights-based justification for the attorney-client
privilege, effective representation by attorneys is essential if an individual is to protect her individual autonomy in an increasingly complex
society, and clients will not tell their attorneys all of the facts necessary
for effective representation unless they believe that the lawyer will
hold such information in confidence. "[T] herefore, confidentiality is
'57
essential to the preservation of individual autonomy.
Not nearly as popular as the utilitarian theory, deontological
analysis suffers from its complexity. It cannot be said that autonomy is
always justified.58 When a client's interest in autonomy conflicts with
others' rights, "a careful review of the legitimacy and weight of competing claims must be undertaken to determine the moral validity of
an act." 59 At least it can be said that the argument does not support
60
an unqualified attorney-client privilege.
C.

The Lawyer

In their Evidence casebook, Professors Eric Green and Charles
Nesson asked the following question about privileges in general:
"[D] oes the existing system of privileges simply reflect ad hoc policy
judgments on specific issues or, more cynically, the relative power of
various economic or social interests?"' 6' Of course, most lawyers do
not cite the theories of Bentham or Kant when invoking the attorney54 IMMANUEL KANT, GRouNDwoRK OF THE
trans., 1964).
55 WOLFRAM, supra note 33, § 2.7, at 75.

METAPHYSIC OF MORALS

89 (H. Paton

56 Id. at 72.
57 Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent
Harm, 70 IoWA L. REv. 1091, 1160 (1985). Subin's article includes a nice restatement

of the rights-based position. See id. Also consult WOLFRAM, supra note 33, § 6.1, at
245.
58 For example, "sophisticated deontological arguments recognize that, although
increasing individual autonomy is good in the abstract, it is not justified in cases
where autonomous decisionmaking leads to immoral acts and results." Pizzimenti,
supra note 46, at 448.

59 Id.
60 See WOLFRAM, supra note 33, § 6.1, at 245; Pizzimenti, supra note 46, at 448.
61

ERic D.

GREEN & CHARLES R. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIAIS ON

EVIDENCE 689 (2d ed. 1994).
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client privilege on behalf of their clients. "From a political point of
view, the vigor of the attorney-client privilege is palpably owed to the
fact that lawyers make such laws and are benefited by them." 62 These
benefits include (1) decreased psychological costs of making difficult
ethical choices; (2) financial gains; and (3) protection of the lawyer's
reputation. 63 However, strict confidentiality also exacts costs on the
bar. "[O]verstated claims for the confidentiality principle have
caused it to come under suspicion[,] ' 64 and it has been said that strict
65
confidentiality perpetuates the lawyer's image as a hired gun.
D.

Conclusion

Neither of the prevailing theories convincingly supports absolute
protection of lawyer-client communications. The utilitarian argument
favors secrecy, but only because (read "insofar as") the fair administration of justice and observance of the law are furthered. 66 Furthermore, a rights-based approach has to take into account the rights of
67
all citizens, not just the right to privacy of a particular client.

Because both utilitarian and deontological arguments rely on the
premise that clients will confide fully in their lawyers only if they believe their lawyer will keep their secrets, any account of the merits and
demerits of a particular exception to the attorney-client privilege must
consider the possibility that lawyer-client communications will be chilled. In Upjohn v. United States,68 the Supreme Court rejected the court
of appeals' use of a so-called control group test, which would have
applied the corporate attorney-client privilege only to communications between lawyers and corporate officers who played a substantial
role in formulating the corporation's legal strategy. The Court said:
The test adopted by the court below is difficult to apply in practice,
though no abstractly formulated and unvarying "test" will necessarily enable to courts to decide questions such as this with mathematical precision. But if the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to
be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with some
62 WOLFRAM, supra note 33, § 6.1, at 247.
63 See Zacharias, supra note 48, at 359-60; see also WOLFRAM, supra note 33, § 6.1,
at 247.
64 WOLFRAM, supra note 33, § 6.1, at 247.
65 See Zacharias, supra note 48, at 360.
66 See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
67 See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.

68

449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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In Jaffee v. Redmond,70 the Seventh Circuit had recognized a federal
psychotherapist-patient privilege, except "if in the interests of justice,
the evidentiary need for the disclosure of the contents of a patient's
counseling sessions outweighs that patient's privacy interests. ' 71 Affirming the Seventh Circuit's holding, the Supreme Court nevertheless "parted company" on the court of appeals' balancing test:
"Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge's
later evaluation of the relative importance of the patient's interest in
privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the
'7 2
effectiveness of the privilege.
If qualification of the attorney-client privilege should be done
with great care, the same can be said of its application. To the extent
that lawyer-client secrecy defines the lawyer-client relationship, inappropriately broad application of the doctrine may perpetuate harmful
73
images of lawyers.

III. SwLz)-_R &BEi_

v. lrvz=

STAT S

In Swidler &? Berlin, the Supreme Court held that notes taken by a
lawyer during a conversation with a now-deceased client were protected from disclosure to a federal grand jury by the attorney-client
privilege. 74 On the facts discussed above,75 the Court reversed the
court of appeals' holding that in criminal proceedings, the attorneyclient privilege should cease to operate posthumously if the relative
importance of the communications is substantial. There, the Independent Counsel had conceded that the notes would have been
69 Id. at 393. The majority conceded that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 requires
privilege rules to be established on a case-by-case basis, thus undermining the overall
"certainty" of the privilege's application. See id. at 396-97.

70 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
71 Id. at 7 (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1357 (7th Cir. 1995)).
72 Id. at 17. The Court said:
These considerations are all that is necessary for the decision in this
case. A rule that authorized the recognition of new privileges on a case-bycase basis [FRE 501] makes it appropriate to define the details of new privi-

leges in a like manner. Because this is the first case in which we have recognized a psychotherapist privilege, it is neither necessary nor feasible to

delineate its full contours in a way that would "govern all conceivable future
questions in this area."

Id. at 18 (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386).
73
74
75

See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081, -2088 (1998).
See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
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covered by the privilege if Foster were still alive, but he argued that
76
the "client's death call[ed] for a qualification of the privilege."
A.

77
In re Sealed Case

In federal courts, the attorney-client privilege is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 501, which states in relevant part:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of rea78

son and experience.

FRE 501 was enacted in 1975 instead of thirteen proposed rules
that would have supplanted the common law of privileges. The rule
empowered federal courts to continue development of the federal
common law of privileges 79 in light of experience and reason.8 0 Experience shed little light on this matter because few cases had explicitly
held that the attorney-client privilege survived the death of the cli76 In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
77 As mentioned earlier, the court of appeals' majority decision serves as a
framework to argue for posthumous qualification of the attorney-client privilege.
This subsection, therefore, summarizes and elaborates on the court's discussion.
Passages that merely summarize the opinion are credited to the opinion, and
extraneous materials are cited to proper authorities.
See generally Casey Nix, Note, In re Sealed Case: The Attorney-Client Privilege-Till
Death Do Us Part?,43 ViLL. L. REv. 285 (1998); Erick S. Ottoson, Comment, Dead Man
Talking: A New Approach to the Post-MortemAttorne,-ClientPrivilege,82 MINN. L. REv. 1329
(1998).
78 FED. R. EvID. 501 (emphasis added), quoted in Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 231.
79 See supranote 72; see also University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189
(1990) ("Moreover, although Rule 501 manifests a congressional desire 'not to freeze
the law of privilege' but rather to provide the courts with flexibility to develop rules of
privilege on a case-by-case basis, we are disinclined to exercise this authority expansively.") (citation omitted).
80 See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 231: The court said:
We take this to be a mandate to the federal courts to approach privilege
matters in the way that common law courts have traditionally addressed any
issue-observing precedent but at the same time trying, where precedents
are in conflict or not controlling, to find answers that best balance the purposes of the relevant doctrines.
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ent.8 ' The court's decision appropriately turned on reason-analysis
of the competing policy interests.
1.

Experience

The federal courts' experiencewith the issue was, at the time of this
case, nonexistent. Nonetheless, that the attorney-client privilege sur8
vived a client's death was viewed as a general rule by courts,

83

2

com-

84

mentators, and modern evidence codes.
Of the cases in which
federal or state courts had mentioned this "general rule," however,
the vast majority (about ninety-five percent) had involved testamentary disputes,8 5 which, as mentioned above, are subject to a wellknown exception to the privilege.8 6 "Thus holdings actually manifest87
ing the posthumous force of the privilege [were] relatively rare."
Nevertheless, at least two state experiences were relevant: a 1990
Massachusetts case, In re John Doe GrandJury Investigation,8 8 and the
89
California Evidence Code attorney-client privilege provisions.
a.

In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation

Many of the facts in this highly-publicized case were not included
in that court's opinion. We benefit from Frances Jewels' Case
Comment: 90

On October 23, 1989, Carol DiMaiti Stuart was fatally shot after she
and her husband, Charles Stuart, attended a birthing class at a Boston hospital. Charles later told police that a robber entered his car
81 In contrast, in two of the previously discussed Supreme Court privilege decisions, Upjohn, see supranotes 68-69 and accompanying text, and Jaffee, see supranotes
70-72 and accompanying text, the privileges at issue had been the objects of much
commentary and judicial attention. E.g. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12 (1996)
("That it is appropriate for the federal courts to recognize a psychotherapist privilege
under Rule 501 is confirmed by the fact that all 50 States and the District of Columbia
have enacted some form of psychotherapist privilege.").
82 See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 231 (citing SimonJ. Frankel, The Attorney-Client Privilege After the Death of the Client, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 45, 47 (1992)).
83 See Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 12, § 5.26, at 430; 8 Wigmore, supra note
14, § 2323, at 630-31, quoted in Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 232.
84 See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 231 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GovERNING LA-wvRRs §127 Reporter's Note, cmt. c (Proposed Final Draft 1996)).
85 See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 231-32 (citing Frankel, supra note 82, at 58 n.65).
86 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
87 Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 232.
88 562 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990), cited in Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 231.
89 CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 953-54 (West 1995), cited in Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 232.
90 Frances M. Jewels, Comment, Evidence-Attony-Client PrivilegeSurvives Client's
Death-In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 25 SuFFoLK U.L. REv. 1260 (1991).
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at a red light... [and] shot his wife in the head and then shot him
in the abdomen before fleeing with their jewelry.
Three months later, Charles' brother, Matthew Stuart, told authorities . . . that he had been an unwitting accomplice to Carol's

murder ....
On January 3, 1990, after Matthew had gone to the police and implicated his brother in the murder, Charles met with his attorney, John
T. Dawley. In the early morning hours of the next day, Charles ap91
parently committed suicide.
The commonwealth wanted disclosure of the substance of
Charles Stuart's meeting with his attorney, arguing that justice required an exception to the attorney-client privilege. 92 Predictably, the
administratrix of Charles Stuart's estate, as well as all of his heirs, ob93
jected to the request.
In its decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged that "the attorney-client privilege may serve as a mechanism to frustrate the investigative or fact-finding process." 9 4 Focusing
on the importance to the administration ofjustice of the right of citizens to obtain advice from a fully informed lawyer, the court
concluded:
A rule that would permit or require an attorney to disclose information given to him or her by a client in confidence, even though such
disclosure might be limited to the period after the client's death,
would in many instances, we fear, so deter the client from "telling
all" as to seriously impair the attorney's ability to function effectively. We think that that potential is inconsistent with the traditional value our society has assigned, in the interests of justice, to
the right to counsel and to an effective attorney-client
95
relationship.
This was the entirety of the court's analysis. In applying the privilege posthumously, the majority rejected a balancing test approach
suggested in the dissent. 96 The court did not consider that Charles
Stuart's interests in maintaining the privilege were insignificant, both
because he was dead and therefore not subject to criminal prosecution and because another significant interest, his reputation among
the community, had already been destroyed by the publicity surrounding the homicide. Furthermore, the court refused to consider soci91
92
93
94
95
96

Id. at 1260-61 (footnotes omitted).
See John Doe, 562 N.E.2d at 69.
See id.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 71.
See id. at 72-73 (Nolan, J., dissenting).
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ety's compelling interest in administering justice-that is, by
prosecuting criminals. 97 Unfortunately, it cannot be said that the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's summary rejection of these
98
arguments was unique.
b.

California Evidence Code

Under the California Evidence Code's attorney-client privilege
provisions, 99 "the privilege ceases to exist when the client's estate is
finally distributed and his personal representative is discharged." 0 0
The framers of the Code commented that, "[a]lthough there is good
reason for maintaining the privilege while the estate is being administered-particularly if the estate is involved in litigation-there is little
reason to preserve secrecy at the expense of excluding relevant evidence after the estate is wound up and the representative is
discharged."10'
97 Matthew Stuart eventually was indicted, along with an accomplice. See Fraternal
Aid, TIME, Oct. 7, 1991, at 27.
98 See, e.g., Arizona v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Ariz. 1976) (rejecting similar arguments in three paragraphs, with little analysis).
99 See CAL. Evm. CODE § 954 (West 1995). Section 954 provides:
§ 954. Lawyer-client privilege
Subject to Section 912 and except as otherwise provided in this article,
the client, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to
prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between client and lawyer if the privilege is claimed by:
(a) The holder of the privilege;
(b) A person who is authorized to claim the privilege by the holder of
the privilege; or
(c) The person who was the lawyer at the time of the confidential communication, but such person may not claim the privilege if there is no
holder of the privilege in existence or if he is otherwise instructed by a person authorized to permit disclosure.
Id. Section 953 provides:
§ 953. Holder of the privilege
As used in this article, "holder of the privilege" means:
(a) The client when he has no guardian or conservator.
(b) A guardian or conservator of the client when the client has a guardian or conservator.
(c) The personal representative of the client if the client is dead.
Id. § 953. See also 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM,FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRocEDuRE § 5498, at
486 (1986) ("Though the California Code does not define 'personal representative,'
it seems reasonable to suppose that it embodies the view.., that the phrase covers
both an executor and an administrator.").
100 CAL. EviD. CODE § 954 cmt.
101 Id.
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The California Evidence Code's treatment of the attorney-client
privilege reflects a judgment that a dead client's right to fully informed counsel is outweighed by other societal goals. In fact, commentators have observed that Rejected FRE 503 would have followed
the California limitation, "personal representative," as a limit on the
duration of the federal attorney-client privilege, 10 2 but, as mentioned
earlier, the proposed rule was rejected in favor of the common law
approach.
c.

Conclusion

Two things can be said about the light that experience sheds on
the issue of posthumous application of the attorney-client privilege.
First, very few state cases (and no federal cases) had tackled the issue
of to what extent the attorney-client privilege shields communications
after the death of the client in the criminal context, and those that
had gave "little revelation of whatever reasoning may have explained
the outcome." 10 3 Second, California's Code of Evidence illustrates the
view that it is not universally held that the attorney-client privilege
should last forever. The Supreme Court itself had expressed the same
10 4
view more than one hundred years ago, as discussed below.
2.

Reason

The court of appeals' analysis was shaped primarily by utilitarian
analysis of the privilege. 10 5 It took great care to avoid the dilemma of
which Upjohn'° 6 warned. There, the Supreme Court had said, "An
uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in
widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all."'1 7 The court of appeals said the holding in this case,
therefore, would be limited to the criminal context.
The important question was whether, and to what extent, clientlawyer communications would be chilled by the prospect of post-death
disclosure in a criminal investigation. The Court introduced a parade
of commentators, all of whom ("with one distinguished exception")
102
103
104
105

See 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 99, § 5498, at 486.
In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 233. For a summary of utilitarian justifications for

the attorney-client privilege, see supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
106
107

See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 234 (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393).
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favored post-death qualification of the attorney-client privilege.' 0 8 For
example, Wright and Graham stated in part:
One would have to attribute a Pharaoh-like concern for immortality
to suppose that the typical client has much concern for how posterity may view his communications. On the other hand, imposing the
privilege after the death will often result in a loss of crucial information because the client is no longer available to be asked what he
knows when the privilege conceals what he told his attorney. 10 9
Mueller and Kirkpatrick similarly argued:
It has been suggested that the privilege of a deceased client be qualified in cases where extreme injustice would be done to a party deprived of critical evidence. For example, if a deceased client has
confessed to criminal acts that are later charged to another, surely
sometimes outweighs the interest in
the latter's need for evidence
10
preserving the confidences.
In addition, Judge Learned Hand had proposed that the privilege
not apply at all after the client's death,"' and McCormick thought
that termination of the privilege at death "could not to any substantial
degree lessen the encouragement for free disclosure."1" 2 The distinguished exception is none other than Professor Wigmore, who stated
in his classic treatise that the attorney-client privilege survived the
death of the client."13 But even Wigmore conceded that this view had
never been questioned, and he did not specifically consider what effects a posthumous exception limited to criminal proceedings would
1 14
have on client-lawyer communications.
The court addressed what it perceived as clients' fears of postdeath revelation. It reasoned that although the possibility of criminal
liability is foreclosed upon death, the risk of civil liability continues." 15
Concern for one's reputation was the other important factor."16 Since
the court limited its discussion to the criminal context, the first of
these fears-civil liability-did not matter."17 The court's determina108 See id. at 232-33.
109 24 WPuJr & GRAHAM, supranote 99, § 5498, at 484 (citations omitted), quoted
in Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 232.
110 MUELER & KMIOATRICK, supra note 12, § 5.26, at 431-32 (citations omitted).
111 See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 232-33.
112 Id. at 232 (quoting 1 McCoRMICK ON EViDENcE § 94, at 350 (4th ed. 1992)).
113
232.
114
115

See 8 WIGMolE, supranote 14, § 2323, at 630-31, cited in Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at
See id.
See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 233.

116 See id.
117

See id. at 234.
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tion would properly turn on the question of to what extent a client's
communications with her lawyer would be chilled by reputational concerns. The majority argued:
In the sort of high-adrenalin situation likely to provoke consultation
with counsel .... we doubt if these... interests will be very powerful; and against them the individual may even view history's claims
to truth as more deserving. To the extent, then, that any post-death
restriction of the privilege can be *confined to the criminal realm of
criminal litigation, we should expect the restriction's chilling effect
to fall somewhere between modest and nil. 118
The court said that an exception limited to the criminal context
would not overly complicate what lawyers must tell their clients about
the confidentiality of their conversations, since the attorney-client
privilege, far from being an absolute privilege, is already riddled with
exceptions. 119
The costs of applying the attorney-client privilege posthumously
were high, since the client himself could no longer be called as a witness, thus eliminating a vital source of information. 120 Eliminating
the source would lead to unjust determinations, at least in some cases,
and this toll, along with the impossibility that the deceased client
118 Id. at 233; accord MUELLER & KIRKPATRIcK, supra note 12, § 5.26, at 431-32.
Mueller & Kirkpatrick write:
A rule requiring occasional disclosure in [the criminal] setting would
not seriously undercut the utilitarian basis of the privilege, which emphasizes the importance of candor between client and lawyer in securing adequate legal representation. Few clients are much concerned with what will
happen sometime after the death that everyone expects but few anticipate in
an immediate or definite sense.
Id.
119 See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 234. Exceptions to the attorney-client privilege are
discussed above. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
In a strong dissent, Judge Tatel observed:
After this decision, lawyers will have to add an important caveat to what
they advise their clients about confidentiality:
I cannot represent you effectively unless I know everything. I will
hold all our conversations in the strictest of confidence. But when
you die, I could be forced to testify-againstyour interests-in a criminal
investigation or trial,even of yourfriends orfamily, if the court decides that
what you tell me is important to the prosecution. Now, please tell me the
whole story.
Id. at 239 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
120 See id. at 233-34. Even when a potential witness' Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination could be invoked, prosecutors may grant the witness immunity from prosecution. In that case, the witness could be compelled to testify, notwithstanding the Fifth Amendment right.
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would be subject to criminal liability, guided the court in crafting the
following test limited to criminal proceedings:1 2 1 (1) "[t]he statements must bear on a significant aspect of the crimes at issue.... ,";122
(2) with respect to that significant aspect, there must be "a scarcity of
reliable evidence"; 123 (3) finally, in camera review is permissible, and
"[t]o the extent that the court finds an interest in confidentiality, it
can take steps to limit access to these communications in a way that is
124
consonant with the analysis justifying relaxation of the privilege."'
B.

Swidler & Berlin v. United States

The Supreme Court agreed to review the court of appeals' decision in In re Sealed Case125 and two months later heard oral arguments
on the matter. The decision reversing the court of appeals' opinion
was announced just two weeks later. 126 On a day that saw the
Supreme Court, in separate cases, declare unconstitutional the lineitem veto law 1 27 and constitutional the denial of grants by the Na-

tional Endowment for the Arts for "indecent" art,128 the decision in
Swidler & Berlin was labeled the day's "Dog bites Man" story. 129 In
fact, the majority opinion roughly occupies a mere five pages in the
Supreme Court Reporter. On the last of those pages, Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated his conclusion that "the Independent Counsel has
simply not made a sufficient showing to overturn the common law
30
rule embodied in the prevailingcaselaw."'
While the Independent Counsel, according to the Court, had
failed to make a sufficient showing, it is clear that he deserved an "A"
for effort. The Independent Counsel reminded the Court that privi121 See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 235.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 118 S. C. 1358 (1998); see Marcia Coyle, Does DeathEnd Client'sPrivilege?Justices
Also Asked to Define Work Product in Foster Case, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 13, 1998, at A7.
126 Oral arguments were heard on June 8, 1998, and the decision was handed
down on June 25, 1998. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2081
(1998).
127 See Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S.Ct. 2091 (1998).
128 See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct 2168 (1998).
129 See NewsHour: Decisions, Decisions (PBS television broadcast, June 25, 1998)
(transcript on file with the Notre Dane Law Review); Steve France, 'Weighty Reasons'for
Secrecy: Effort to Acquire Posthumous Notes SpursAttorney-ClientPrivilegeRuling, 84 A.B.A- J.
44 (1998) (quoting Mark I. Levy, amici counsel).
130 Swidler & Berlin, 118 S.Ct at 2088 (emphasis added). When the Court said
"prevailing caselaw," it meant cases in which the general rule was assumed, but not
expressly held. Cases actually passing on the question are extremely rare.
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leges are to be strictly construed.13 1 In its brief, the Office of the Independent Counsel (OIC) had argued that the matter was one of
construction, not of narrowing,the attorney-client privilege, since it was
"not aware of any ... reported federal case addressing whether the
attorney-client privilege applies in criminal proceedings when the client is deceased."1 3 2 Distinguishing Supreme Court precedent, United
States v. Nixon 133 and Bransburgv. Hayes,'34 on the ground that those
cases involved creationof a privilege, Rehnquist characterized the issue
in this case as whether to narrow the oldest of all privileges, "contrary
to the weight of the existing body of caselaw." 13 5 On this point, however, minds can differ.
First, at least in federal courts, a posthumous attorney-client privilege had never been constructed. 3 6 The Court said that in one 1897
case, Glover v. Patten,137 it had "expressly assumed" posthumous continuation of the privilege.138 This statement was misleading, since in
Glover the Court had said merely that " [w] hile such communications
might be privileged if offered by third persons to establish claims against an
estate, they are not within the reason of the rule requiring their exclusion, when the contest is between the heirs or next of kin."' 3 9 Con131 See Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2087-88. On strict construction, see supra
notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
132 Government's Brief at 9-10, Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081
(1998) (No. 97-1192).
133 418 U.S. 683 (1974); see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
134 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
135 Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2088.
136 See id. at 2084 ("[C]ases addressing the existence of the privilege after
death ... uniformly presume the privilege survives, even if they do not so hokl") (emphasis added).
137 165 U.S. 394 (1897).
138 Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2085.
139 Glover, 165 U.S. at 406 (emphasis added). In a separate passage, the court
quoted from an English case, Russel v. Jackson, 9 Hare. 387, 68 Eng. Rep. 558 (V.C.
1851):
In the cases of testamentary dispositions, the very foundation on which
the rule proceeds seems to be wanting; and in the absence, therefore, of any
illegal purpose entertained by the testator, there does not appear to be any
ground for applying it... That the privilege does not in all cases terminate
with the death of the party, I entertain no doubt. That it belongs equally to
parties claiming under the client as against parties claiming adversely to him,
I entertain as little doubt .... In the one case the question is, whether the
property belongs to the client or his estate, and the rule may well apply for
the protection of the client's interests. In the other case the question is, to
which of two parties claiming under the client the property in equity belongs, and it would seem to be a more arbitrary rule to hold that it belongs
to one of them, rather than to the other.
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trary to the Court's assertion, Glover, at most, expressly assumed that
the privilege survived for the duration of the client's estate, not indefinitely. In this sense, the Glover assumption was like the durational limits in the California Evidence Code. 40 Oddly enough, the Court itself
characterized the California rules as "exceptional" in the sense that
the "privilege terminates when the estate is wound up."' 4 ' "[N] o
other State has followed California's lead," the Court noted.' 4 2 But
long before the California rule was enacted, the Court in Glover v.
Patten had "expressly assumed" the lead itself.
A second reason to disagree with the Court on the issue of strict
construction is that cases expressly holding that the attorney-client
privilege survived indefinitely after the death of the client are extremely rare. 43 And even when state courts have considered the issue, they have said little to justify their position.' 4 4 As has already
been discussed, 45 state decisions concluding that the attorney-client
privilege applied posthumously were unaccompanied by sufficient
support for these conclusions. When the Court cited these cases to
support its conclusion, 4 6 it inadvertently illustrated both the high
costs that the privilege, when applied broadly, can exact on society,
and the tendency by courts to apply the privilege broadly without
reason.
Perhaps anticipating the Court's judgment on this country's experience with the privilege, the Independent Counsel also argued that
posthumous qualification of the attorney-client privilege was logically
supported by the recognized testamentary exception. 147
The public's need for determining whether a crime has been committed (and if so, by whom) warrants at least parity of treatment to
that afforded the interest in resolving will contests with precise accuracy. If "who gets Blackacre" is sufficient to trump the privilege after the client's death, then questions raised in the criminal
process-who gets indicted, who gets convicted, who gets punGlover, 165 U.S. at 407.
140 See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
141 Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2085 n.2.
142 Id.
143 See generally supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. See also Frankel, supra
note 82, at 58 n.65.
144 See 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 99, § 5498, at 484 ("Those who favor an
eternal duration for the privilege seldom do much by way ofjustifying this in terms of
policy.").
145 See supra notes 95, 98 and accompanying text.
146 See Swidler & Berlin, 118 S.Ct. at 2085.
147 For a brief discussion of exceptions to the attorney-client privilege, see supra
note 20 and accompanying text.
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ished-are surely sufficient to trump the privilege after the client's
14 8
death.
The Court dismissed this argument, since the testamentary exception was justified as furthering the intent of the client. "There is no
reason to suppose as a general matter that grand jury testimony about
confidential communications furthers the client's intent," said the
Court.1

49

When, at oral argument, the Independent Counsel argued

that ifit is every citizen's duty to testify truthfully in criminal matters
and ifthe Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination did
not apply, then the law should presume that every citizen's intent
would be to disclose relevant matters, the Court responded
skeptically:
MR. KAVANAUGH:... [P] resume that a person near death would
want to fulfill what this court has called his basic obligation as a
citizen to provide information to a grand jury?
And even on the facts of this case[COURT]: Because there are a great number of people who know
they have that obligation, or at least that there is a general theory
that they have that obligation, but they do not, in fact, want to fulfill
it.
1 50
I mean, we're being realistic, I think.

How unlikely the court of appeals' limited exception would make
the occurrence of "full and frank" communication was the issue at the
heart of the case. The Court acknowledged that the rule limited to
criminal proceedings would not render the privilege totally ineffective. 15 1 It quickly followed, however: "While the fear of disclosure, and
the consequent withholding of information from counsel, may be reduced if disclosure is limited to posthumous disclosure in a criminal
context, it seems unreasonable to assume that it vanishes altogether."' 52 The Court was apparently concerned about clients' worries about their reputation, civil liability, or harm to friends and
family. 153 The test adopted by the court of appeals, if only in criminal
proceedings, introduced too much uncertainty into the privilege's application for the Court's taste, especially since a client may not always
148
(1998)
149
150
118 S.
151
152
153

Government's Brief at 17, Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081
(No. 97-1192).
Swidler & Berlin, 118 S.Ct. at 2086.
Oral Argument, 1998 WL 309279, at *29-30, Swidler & Berlin v. United States,
Ct. 2081 (1998).
See Swidler & Berlin, 118 S.Ct. at 2086.
Id.
See id.

1999]

SWIDLER

&

BERLINA

V.

UNITED STA TES

know if disclosed information will become relevant to a future civil or
15 4
criminal matter.
The Court did not foreclose the possibility that the privilege
would be limited in the future. In footnote 3, the Court spoke of
"exceptional circumstances" that could warrant departure from its
holding. "Petitioner, while opposing wholesale abrogation of the privilege in criminal cases, concedes that exceptional circumstances implicating a criminal defendant's constitutional rights might warrant
breaching the privilege. We do not, however, need to reach this issue,
since such exceptional circumstances clearly are not presented
55

here."1
Footnote 3 may be the most telling passage in Swidler & Berlin.

Professor Charles Wolfram, chief reporter for the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, suggested shortly
after the opinion was issued that the ruling was "not the devastating
blow to critics of an absolute privilege that many are calling it."' 56 He

speculated that the footnote was the price for winning over one or
more Justices for the majority. 157
- Otherwise, those Justices may have
joined Justice O'Connor, who issued a striking dissent. 5 8
O'Connor's dissent was "striking" because of its concern for defendants' rights. 15 9 The dissenters' position was that the attorney-client privilege should not be an "absolute bar to the disclosure of a
deceased client's communication." 60 Instead, "[w]hen the privilege
is asserted in the criminal context, and a showing is made that the
communications at issue contain necessary factual information not
otherwise available, courts should be permitted to assess whether interests of fairness and accuracy outweigh the justifications for the
6
privilege."' '
In my view, the paramount value that our criminal justice system
places on protecting an innocent defendant should outweigh a deceased client's interest in preserving confidences. ... "Our historic

commitment to the rule of law... is nowhere more profoundly
154 See id.
155 See id. at 2087 n.3.
156 France, supra note 129 (quoting Prof. Charles Wolfram).
157 See id.
158 See id.
159 Linda S. Mullenix, Court Preserves the Privileges of the Dead, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 10,
1998, at B13. The dissent in Swidler & Berlin v. United States appears at 118 S. Ct.
2088-2091 (O'Connor, Scalia, & Thomas, JJJ., dissenting).

160
161

Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2089.
Id.
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manifest than in our view that the twofold aim of criminal justice is
162
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer."
In the end, the Foster notes were protected. The Supreme Court,
in a very short opinion, had confirmed what most lawyers already suspected. They would take their clients' secrets to the grave-at least
for now.
IV.

SOLUTION: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS TO POST-DEATH SECRECY

The problem in Section 1, The Privileged and the Damned,163 was
based on a 1976 case, Arizona v. Macumber.6 4 In that case, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the confession by the now-deceased
client was privileged and, in effect, damned William Macumber to two
life sentences, although he was probably innocent. Macumber speaks
volumes about prosecutorial discretion in America, 65 but it also
speaks volumes about the judiciary. The majority in Macumber dismissed arguments raised by the defendant's lawyer in three simple
paragraphs, never addressing the wisdom of a rule that absolutely
shields from disclosure lawyer-client communications after the death
of the client.
In The Privileged and the Damned, as in Macumber, the costs of honoring the privilege are high-the defendant will potentially spend the
rest of his life in prison. Furthermore, as in In re GrandJury Investigation,1 66 the privilege is asserted in the name of a client with little, if
anything, to lose from disclosure. First, his death has foreclosed any
possibility of criminal prosecution; second, his reputation has already
been damaged by the first murder trial. Curiously, in Macumber, the
privilege was neither invoked by the deceased client's lawyers nor by
his friends and family. Instead, the issue was raised by the trial court
sua sponte.
In Macumber, Justice Holohan argued in a special concurrence
that a criminal defendant's constitutional right to present a defense
and to compel witnesses also required admission of the lawyers' testimony. 167 This question was not addressed by the majority. Justice
Holohan was onto something, however. Swidler & Berlin's footnote 3
162 Id. (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974)) (second ellipses
in original).

163

See supra text accompanying note 11.

164 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976).
165 The attorney-general of Arizona at the time was Bruce Babbit. Coincidentally,

the defendant's counsel in Macumberwas named James Hamilton. See Macumber, 544
P.2d at 1085.
166
167

See generally supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
See Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1088.
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hinted of a future exception to posthumous application of the attorney-client privilege, possibly arising when a criminal defendant's constitutional rights are implicated. 168 Justice O'Connor's dissent
emphasized that "the paramount value [the] criminal justice system
places on protecting an innocent defendant should outweigh a deceased client's interest in preserving confidences."'169
For all of its faults, the holding in Swidler & Berlin was wisely limited to its facts. 1 70 If, as Professor Wolfram suggests, footnote 3 was
the price for winning over votes from the dissent, the future will probably hold that the attorney-client privilege is trumped if the client is
dead and the limitation on the defendant's rights outweigh the policies furthered by application of the privilege.
Thus, today the problem would probably yield a different result
from the case on which it is based. In the problem, the client's constitutional rights of confrontation and compulsory process are clearly
iIvoked. Furthermore, a strong argument exists that the policies embodied by post-death application of the attorney-client privilege are
outweighed by the limitation on the defendant's rights. First,
although utilitarian explanations for the privilege' 7 1 favor secrecy,
they do so for the sake of fair administration ofjustice and observance
of the law. If the rule were limited to cases in which the dead client's
statements might exonerate a criminal defendant, chilling of clientlawyer communications would be minimal. 172 Of California, where a
broader limitation has been in place for decades, it cannot be said
that the judicial system has come to a halt. 173 Most importantly, the
drastic results produced by the current rule cannot be said to promote
the fair administration ofjustice. In The Privileged and the Damned,for
example, absolute fidelity to the rule will result in a wrongful conviction and sentencing. Rights-based analysis' 74 recognizes that when a
client's interest in autonomy conflicts with others' rights, "a careful
review of the legitimacy and weight of competing claims must be undertaken to determine the moral validity of an act.' 175 In the problem, "careful review" shows that the defendant's constitutional rights
168
169
170
171

See supra notes 155-62 and accompanying text.
Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2089.
See supra text accompanying notes 130.
See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.

172

Recall that cases facing this issue are extremely rare. See supra notes 85-87 and

accompanying text.
173

Accord Oral Argument, 1998 WL 309279, at *8-10, (Scalia, J., questioning

James Hamilton).
174

See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.

175

Pizzimenti, supra note 46, at 448.
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to confront witnesses, compulsory process, and due process of law
trump dead client's interest in autonomy, especially since the evi176
dence could exonerate the defendant.
THE LAWYER

Swidler & Berlin's five pages did not cover ethical issues at the
heart of attorney-client privilege issues. I repeat the assertion that
inappropriately broad application of the privilege may perpetuate
harmful images of the bar, 17 7 and what better way to illustrate the
point than to recall the abusive use of prosecutors' discretion in cases
178
like iMacumber.
I also argued above that any qualification of the attorney-client
privilege must be narrow enough to preserve the image of lawyer-client loyalty. Public perception of lawyers was, after all, an essential
premise in the dominant theoretical justifications for the privilege.
According to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, "A lawyer shall
not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the
client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation.... ." Society admires a lawyer's loyalty to his or her clients, dead or alive, and it
is every lawyer's ethical duty to assert the privilege whenever it is applicable, if only arguably. 179 If and when absolute application of the posthumous privilege dies, this ethical duty will survive.
Isaac Ruiz*

176 For a brief discussion of these Constitutional issues, see supranotes 21-24 and
accompanying text.
177
178

See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 165.

179
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